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Correlates of Progressive Taxation in the American States
H. BROOKS
University of Mississippi

GARY

The decade of the 1960's witnessed a significant new development in
the study of state and local politics-the investigation of the relation ships between socioeconomic and political variables and policy outp uts.
Dawson and Robinson\ Dye 2, Hofferbert8, Froman\ and Sharkansky6
were the pioneers in this area and their work was focused initially at the
state level. The groundbreaking work of these political scientists followed
the earlier studies of the relationship between socioeconomic variab les
and the magnitude of governmental expenditures in the states by economists such as Fabricant 6, Fisher 7 , and Sachs and Harris. 8
To a great extent political scientists engaged in comparative policy
studies at the state level have continued to focus their attention on the
relationships between various socioeconomic and political variables and
the level of governmental expenditures in various policy areas ( e.g.,
welfare, highways, and education) .9 To date, three major findings appe ar
to have emerged from this rather extensive body of literature: ( l ) that
socioeconomic variables have relatively high explanatory power for
public policy outputs measured in terms of levels of revenues and ex1 Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic
Variables and Welfare Politics in the American States," Journal of Politics, 25
( 1963), 265-289.
2 Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public ( Chicago: Rand McNally,
1966).
3 Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation between Public Policy and Some Structura l
and Environmental Variables in the American States," American Political Science
Review, 60 ( 1966), 73-82.
4 Lewis A. Froman, "Some Effects of Interest Group Strength in State Politics,"
American Political Science Review, 60 ( 1966), 952-961.
5 Ira Sharkansky, "Correlates of State Government Expenditures," paper prepared
for delivery at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, 1966 (mimeo).
6 Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activity in the United States
Since 1900 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952), ch. 6
7 Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures,"
National Tax Journal, 14 (1961), 349-355; "Interstate Variation in State and Local
Government Expenditures," ibid., 17 ( 1964), 57-64.
8 Seymour Sachs and Robert Harris, "The Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds , " Ibid., 17 ( 1964),
75-85.
9 For an excellent review of this literature, see Richard I. Hofferbert, "State and
Community Policy Studies: A Review of Comparative Input-Output Analyses," in
Jam es A. Robinson, ed., Political Science Annual Ill (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1972).
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penditures; ( 2) that political variables generally have little or no independent impact on levels of revenues and expenditures ( with the possible
exception of welfare-education policies) 10 ; ( 3) and that the explanatory
power of socioeconomic variables varies depending on the type of expenditure examined ( with the relationship being particularly weak in
the area of welfare expenditures).
This early preoccupation with the explanation of the magnitude of
state policy efforts as measmed by levels of revenues and expenditures
led to the neglect of the distributional aspects of governmental policies.
The concern of Harold Lasswell for "who gets what, when, and how" 11
was generally overlooked as the search for explanations of the levels of
governmental policy efforts took precedence over the explanation of the
distribution of the costs and benefits of governmental policies.
The first major effort to counter this neglect of the distributional aspects
of governmental policies appeared in 1970.12 In a seminal work, Fry and
Winters suggested that prior findings regarding the primacy of socioeconomic variables in the explanation of state policy outputs had been
the result of the examination of a measure of public policy (levels of
revenues and expenditures) in which the influence of political system
characteristics is likely to be neglible.
Fry and Winters shifted attention to the net redistributive impact of
revenue and expenditure policies in the states. As they had expected,
Fry and Winters found that political variables were considerably more
powerful than socioeconomic variables in explaining interstate variations
in redistiibutive patterns. 13 By shifting the analysis of public policy in
the states from the explanation of revenue and expenditure levels to the
distribution of the benefits and costs of revenue and expenditure policies,
Fry and Winters attempted to revive Lasswell's concern for who gets
what, when, and how and called attention to a dimension of public policy
which appears to be affected significantly by political variables. 14
1 0 See Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics,
Economics, and Public Policy," American Political Science Review, 63 ( 1969), 867879; and Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," American Political Science Review, 63 ( 1969),
265-289.
11 Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: P.
Smith, 1950).
12 Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," American Political Science Review, 64 ( 1970), 508-522.
13 Fry and Winters found that socioeconomic variables alone accounted for 17%
of the variance in redistribution in the 48 states and that political variables accounted
for 38%of that variance.
14
For critiques of Fry and Winters, see John L. Sullivan, "A Note on Redistributive Politics," American Political Science Review, 66 ( 1972), 1301-1305; and
Bernard H. Booms and James R. Halldorson, "The Politics of Redistribution: A
Reformulation," American Political Science Review, 67 ( 1973), 924-933.
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Even more neglected than the question of who gets what, when, and
how has been the question of who pays what, when , and how. Despite
the fact that the allocation of tax costs is among the primary political
concerns of many citizens , political scientists have paid little attenti on
to the direct allocation of the monetary costs of governmental activity
or to the forces which impinge upon that allocation. 15
One of the few political scientists to direct his attention to the analysis
of tax policy in the American states is Thomas R. Dye .16 Dye prese nts a
model for the analysis of public policy derived from the early work of
David Easton.17 In the Dye model, inputs are operationalized in terms
of measures of income, urbanization , industrialization, and ed ucation;
the political system is operationalized in terms of party compe tition,
legislative malapportionment, electoral participation, and Democratic
control of the legislature and governor's office; tax policy is operati onalized in terms of levels of taxation, average tax burden, and the perce ntage
of state taxes raised through various tax measures ( e.g., personal income,
sales, and gasoline).
Dye's major findings concerning state tax policies are summarized
below:
1. State tax levels are directly related to measures of economic development.
2. Low average state tax burdens are directly related to meas ures of
economic development ( particularly measures of industrializati on).
3. No significant relationship exists between measures of economic development and the degree to which a state relies upon income or
sales taxes as a source of tax revenue.
4. Political variables have no significant independent relationship with
any measure of state tax policies.
For those interested in the explanation of interstate variations in the
distribution of tax costs, Dye's findings are somewhat puzzling. The impact of measures of economic development on state tax levels and average tax burdens is not surprising and reinforces existing evidence th at
socioeconomics variables have relatively high explanatory value in terms
of public policy measured by levels of taxes and expenditures. The sur15 Major exceptions to this neglect include: Clara Penruman, "The Politics of
Taxation," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, eds., Politics in the American
States ( Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), 520-555; Ira Sharkansky, The Politics of Taxing and Spend ing (Indiana polis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); and Glenn W.
Fisher, Taxes and Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969).
16 Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public, ch. 7.
1 7 See David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," W01'ld
Politics, 9 ( 1957), 383-400; and Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Eng lewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965).
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rising facet of Dye's study is the finding that neither socioeconomic
~ariables nor political variables have significant explanatory power in relation to state reliance upon progressive or regressive taxes as revenue
measures.
If Dye's findings are correct, they have great significance for the future
direction of research attempting to explain interstate variations in the
distribution of tax costs. Assuming the accuracy of Dye's analysis, the
major thrust of future research into this area of public policy should be
focused on the processes by which tax policy is insulated from the impact of socioeconomic and political influences. A promising start in this
direction has been made by Ira Sharkansky. 18 Sharkansky argues that
taxing and spending decisions are surrounded by conflict and controversy
and that no infallible economic guidelines about what "ought" to be done
exist. Sharkansky identifies two syndromes of decision-making behavior
designed to cope with this conflict: contained specialization and incrernentalism. Contained specialization refers to the attempt to isolate fiscal
decision-making from the conflict of the political arena and to the willingness of decision-makers to defer to the recommendations of "experts"
on specific questions. Incrementalism refers to the attempt to reduce the
complexity of fiscal decision-making by accepting previous decisions
without review and focusing attention upon changes at the margin of
existing policies.
Dye's work, however, has been subjected to a rather vigorous critical
examination, and a re-examination of the relationships between various
socioeconomic and political variables and state tax policies would appear to be in order. A great deal of the difficulty encountered in Dye's
analysis lies in his analytic model. As Jacob and Lipsky note, "The first
problem with this [Dye's] operationalized model is that income, urbanization, and education are not in themselves inputs." 19 Income, urbanization, and education might be viewed more accurately as environmental
factors which may serve to stimulate or depress the communication of
certain demands and supports to public officials. Inputs, in the more
commonly accepted usage of the term, refer not to forces or conditions
such as education, urbanization, and income but to verbalizations or behavioral manifestations of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the status
quo.20 While the relationship between inputs and environment may be
quite high, the relationship is by no means perfect nor constant.
Sharkansky, The Politics of Taxing and Spending.
Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure, and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics" Journal of Politics,
30 ( 1968 ), 510-538.
'
20
David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1965), 38ff.
18
19

116

JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE

The second major difficulty encountered in Dye's analysis lies in his
inadequate operationalization of the political system. While electoral
participation, party competition, legislative malapportionment, and p arty
control may be important political valiables, they cannot adequately rep.
resent the whole of the political system nor perhaps even its more important elements. Dye ignores, for example , the power of the governor,
the degree of "professionalism" evident in state government and other
possibility crucial characteristics of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of state governments. In other words, the formal governmental system of a state is neglected in Dye's analysis.
Building on the prior work of Dye and benefiting from the critiq ues
of that work, a re-examination of the relationship between selected socioeconomic and political variables and tax policies in the American states
will be attempted. The major differences between this study and the
earlier study of Dye will be that ( 1) a different analytic model will be
employed; ( 2) additional independent variables will be incorporate d in
the analysis ( in particular, those variables which Dye labels "politi cal
system variables" will be expanded in coverage); and ( 3) a new measure
designed to more accurately represent intrestate differences in the distribution of tax costs among income groups will be utilized.

Research Design
The design of this study is based on the assumption that there are
three classes of variables which constitute the major influences shap ing
th e distribution of tax costs in a state . The model posits that the socio•
economic environment of a society, the level and types of dem ands
placed upon governmental institutions, and the characteristics of th ese
governmental institutions are the major forces which shape the distri bution of tax costs among income groups within a state .
Dependent Variable
The first major obstacle to be encountered is the task of devising a
satisfactory measure of interstate variations in the distribution of tax
costs among income groups in the states . Any attempt to determine the
actual distribution of tax costs among income groups faces rather formidable problems. In addition to complex economic questions of tax shifting, individual income and expenditure patterns constantly chang e,
making the most sophisticated computation of tax incidence only a welleducated estimated. Despite these difficulties, some economists have attempted to make these estimates . Studies of tax policies in the American
states are handicapped, however, by the lack of tax inciden ce da ta compiled on a state-by-state basis. The absence of this information, pre vents
any direct comparative analysis of interstate variation in tax incidence.
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Fortunately the construction of an indirect measure of interstate variations in the distribution of tax burdens among income groups does not
ose insurmountable difficulties. Of the more commonly used state taxes,
~e individual income, the corporate income, and estate and gift taxes
are considered to be the more progressive tax sources . Sales and property taxes are considered to be quite regressive revenue sources. 21 In
order to obtain a measure of the degree to which a state has chosen progressive tax sources over regressive tax sources as a means of raising
revenues, this study will utilize the ratio of the percentage of state tax
revenue raised through progressive taxes ( individual income plus corporate plus estate and gift taxes) to the percentage of state tax revenue
raised through regressive taxes ( sales plus property taxes). A ratio exceeding unity would indicate reliance upon progressive tax sources; conversely, a ratio of less than unity would indicate reliance upon regressive
tax sources. Table 1 presents the ratio of progressive tax reliance to regressive tax reliance for the 48 states based on data from 1971.22

Independent Variables
The independent variables used in this analysis are divided into three
classes: socioeconomic environment variables, demand structure variables, and governmental system variables. Measures of the socioeconomic
environment utilized in this study include median family income, industrialization ( percentage of labor force engaged in manufacturing),
urbanization ( percentage of population living in towns over 100,000),
education ( median school years completed by persons over 25), percentage of families with less than $3,000 annual income, 23 and the Cini
index of income inequality. 24
The first four variables ( income, industrialization, urbanization, and
education) were selected on the basis of their prior usage by Dye and
the high explanatory power they have exhibited in previous studies as
correlates of levels of revenues and expenditures. Assuming that as a
state develops economically a larger portion of its resources becomes
available for redistributive policies such as progressive taxation, the
measures of income, industrialization, urbanization, and education should
be positively related to progressive taxation in the states. This hypothesis
21 See George A. Bishop, "Tax Burden by Income Class," National Tax Journal,
14 (1961), 54.
22 Based on data obtained from Book of the States, 1970-71 ( Chicago: Council
of State Governments, 1970).
23 Measures for these first five variables were obtained from U. S. Department of
Co=erce, Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, General Social and
Economic Characteristics.
24 Thomas R. Dye, "Income Inequality and American State Politics," American
Political Science Review, 63 (1969), 157-162.
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assumes the existence of a "resource linkage" between the socioeconomic
environment and public policy outputs. 25
The percentage of families with less than $3,000 annual income and
the Cini index of income inequality were included on the assumption of
a "need linkage" between these variables and progressive taxation in
the states. 26 If the assumption of a need linkage between environme nt
and policy outputs is correct, progressive taxation should vary dire ctly
with the Cini index of income inequality and the percentage of families
with incomes under $3,000.
The first political variable used in this analysis is a measure designed
to tap variations in the cultural milieu of state political systems. The
Sharkansky-Elazar political culture scale assigns each state a political
culture score ranging from one to nine along a continuum from "moralist" to "individualist" to "traditionalist" culture. 27 Sharkansky notes that
one of the most important factors which differentiate the three cultur es
is their views toward governmental intervention in the community. The
moralist culture welcomes intervention for the good of the community;
the individualist would minimize intervention to permit a balance between activities in the private and public sectors; and the tradition alist
would oppose all government interventions except those designe d to
maintain the status quo. On this basis, progressive taxation is expected
to vary inversely with scores on the Sharkansky-Elazar political culture
scale ( high scores denote more traditionalistic cultures.)
Levels of electoral participation, 28 legislative inducements to participation, 29 Democratic partisanship, 80 the degree of interparty competition, 81 and interest group strength 82 are used as further indicato rs of
demand structure in the states. The initial hypothesis is that higher levels
25 See Ira Sharkansky, "Economic Theories of Public Policy: Resource-Policy and
Need-Policy Linkages Between Income and Welfare Benefits," Midwest Journal of
Political Science, 15 ( 1971), 722-740.
2a Ibid.
2 7 See Ira Sharkansky, "The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture: A Research
Note," Polity, 2 ( 1969 ), 66-83.
2 8 The participation index is taken from Lester W. Milbraith, "Individuals and
Government," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (eds.), Politics in the American
States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 36.
29 This index is a summed measure noting the extent to which each state has legal
measures facilitating participation, e.g. absence of literacy tests and residency requirements, permanent registration, etc. See Milbraith, ibid., 46-47.
80 This measure was obtained from Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in
Jacob and Vines, ibid., 87.
81 This measure was derived from Ranney's composite index, see ibid. The index
is adjusted for this study to eliminate information about the partisan direction of
one-party dominance. The adjusted formula is: Adjusted Ranney Index
1.00 ( .5000-- x), where x is the value of each state score on Ranney's index. Scores on
the adjusted range from a minimum of .5000 to a maximum of 1.000.
82 The measure of interest group strength is taken from Belle Zeller, American
State Legislatures (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1954), 190-192.
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f political participation will be associated with more progressive dis~butions of tax costs in the states. The measures of electoral participation and legislative inducements to participation are related to this hypothesis. Accepting the proposition that lower income groups are less likely
to be politically active, the assumption is that the higher the level of
electoral participation, the more likely it is that voters in the lower income groups have participated. Increased electoral participation among
lower income groups is presumed to increase pressure for tax measures
that are favorable to that group, i.e., progressive taxes. 33 The use of Milbraith's index of legislative inducements to participation is based on a
similar rationale. Assuming that legal barriers to participation are likely
to have a greater impact on lower income groups, it is hypothesized that
the removal or absence of such barriers will have a greater impact on
participation among lower income groups.
The partisan direction of electoral behavior is another component of
demand structure. The extent of interparty competition and the degree
of Democratic partisanship are used to measure this dimension of demand structure. Following V. 0. Key's hypothesis that interparty competition promotes the distribution of benefits to lower income groups, 34
progressive taxation is expected to vary directly with interparty competition. The degree of Democratic partisanship evident in a state is included on the assumption that the Democratic party is more favorable
to programs benefiting lower income groups than is the Republican
party. Progressive taxation, then, is expected to vary directly with the
degree of Democratic partisanship.
The final measure of demand structure is interest group strength. Interest group strength is expected to be negatively related to the adoption
of progressive taxation. This hypothesis is based on Schattschneider's
contention that interest group politics incorporates a bias against lower
income groups which typically are not represented or are under-represented in the interest group system. 35
Eight variables have been selected to represent important characteristics of state governmental institutions. Three of the variables are related to the legislative branch of state government: legislative accountability/ representativeness, 36 legislative professionalism, 37 and legislative
33 For evidence that lower income groups do indeed prefer progressive tax measures, see Elizabeth L. David, "A Comparative Study of Tax Preferences," National
Tax Journal, 21 (1968), 98-102.
34 V. 0. Key, Southern Politics ( New York: Random House, 1949 ), 298-311.
85 E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1960), 30-33.
86 This measures combines state scores on two components of the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures' FAIR scale. See Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, State Legislatures: An Evaluation of their Effectiveness ( New York: Praeger,
1971). The accountability score is based on fourteen items related to comprehensi-
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party cohesion. 38 Legislative accountability/ representativeness is expected to be associated with more progressive distributions of tax burdens. This expectation is based on the assumption that accountable and
representative legislatures will be more easily subjected to constituenc y
demands and, thus, less likely to take policy cues from internal elites or
interest groups. Progressive taxation is also expected to vary directly with
legislative professionalism and legislative party cohesion. The rationa le
for the expected relationship between progressive taxation and legislative professionalism is based on the contention of Uslaner and Weber
that legislative professionalism is a reflection of legislative liberalis m.
Uslaner and Weber argue:
... the later concept [legislative professionalism] implies that a state
has a well-paid legislature which processes a large number of bills
dming any legislative session. Conservatives have often opposed the
idea of a professional legislature on the basic ideological grounds
that the best government is the one which does the least. Liber als,
on the other hand, prefer a more activist government and would be
more likely to support increased facilities and salary scale for state
legislators. 39
The hypothesis concerning the relationship between legislative party cohesion and progressive taxation is based on the assumption that the accommodation of the diverse interests required to produce party cohesion
will lead to the enactment of more progressive tax measures.
Gubernatorial power 40 and tenure potential 41 are included in this
analysis on the basis of two assumptions . First, it is assumed that governors must respond to the interests of a diverse and broad-based constituency and, as a result, are more likely to support progressive tax
measures. Second, it is assumed that greater re-election possibilities and
bility, public access to and adequacy of information, and internal accountability. The
representativeness score is based on ten items related to identification of members
and constituents, diversity, and member effectiveness.
37 For the legislative professionalism index see Tohn G. Grwnm, "Effects of Legislative Structure on Legislative Performance," in Richard I. Hofferbert and Ira
Sharkansky (eds.), State and Urban Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 298-322.
38 The legislative party cohesion score is taken from Duane Lockard, "State Party
Systems and Policy Outputs," in Oliver Garceau, ed., Political Research and Political
Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). Index scores have been reversed so that high scores are reflective of high levels of party cohesion.
39 Eric M. Uslaner and Ronald E. Weber, "The 'Politics' of Redistribution :
Towards a Model of the Policy-Making Process in the American States," ( unpu blished mimeo), 15.
40 For this measure see Joseph L. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive,"
in Jacob and Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States, 232.
41 Ibid.
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extensive fonnal authority will provide governors with the necessary
roeans to accomplish their policy objectives.
Only one measure of the judicial branch of state government is used
in this exploratory study. In a number of states, supreme court interpretations of constitutional limitations on state taxing power have proved
formidable barriers to progressive taxation . The hypothesis is that the
percentage of Democrats on the state supreme comt will be positively
related to progressive taxation. 42 This hypothesis is based on two assumptions: that the Democratic party is more favorable to programs benefiting
lower income groups than is the Republican party and that party identification influences judicial behavior. 43
Finally , two measures of general characteristics of state governmental
institutions are included: innovativeness 44 and percentage of state employees under civil service coverage. 45 These two variables are assumed
to be measures of the "reformist" character of state political systems.
Progressive distribution of tax costs is expected to vary directly with
these measures of "reformism."
The major hypothesis of this study is that political variables will have
greater explanatory value in regard to the distribution of tax costs among
income groups than will socioeconomic variables. Following Fry and
Winters, it is argued here that when attention is focused on the explanation of the distribution of benefits and/ or costs rather than the levels of
expenditures or revenues political variables have higher explanatory
value than do socioeconomic variables.
The subsidiary hypotheses concerning the relationship between each
independent variable and the dependent variable will also be tested. In
order to test these hypotheses, separate multiple regression analyses will
be undertaken for the 48 states 46 and for the non-Southern states. Overall coefficients of multiple co1Telation and determination will be utilized
as indicators of the explanatory power of the model. Simple and partial
coefficients of correlation will be used to test the relationship between
each independent variable and pr ogressive taxation . Multiple-partial
42 For data on party affiliation of state supreme court justices, see Stuart S. Nagel,
The Legal Process from a Behavioral Perspective ( Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey
Press, 1969).
43 For evidence that party identification affects judicial behavior, see Stuart S.
agel, "Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions," American Political Science
Review, 55 ( 1961 ), 843-850; and Sidney Ulmer, "The Political Party Valiable on
the Michigan Supreme Court," Journal of Public Law, 11 ( 1962), 352-362 .
44 For the innovation index see Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations
among the American States," American Political Science Review, 63 ( 1969 ), 880-899 .
45 Council of State Governments, Book of the States, 1972-1973 (Lexington Ky:
Council of State Governments, 1972).
46 Alaska and Hawaii have been excluded because data for some of the independent variables were not available.
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coefficients of determination will be employed to assess the rela tive
importance of political and socioeconomic variables in explaining interstate variations in the distribution of tax burdens among income groups.
As Table 2 indicates, this effort to develop an explanatory model of
interstate differences in the distribution of tax costs among income
groups has been moderately successful. The multiple coefficient of determination (R 2 ) is .41 for all 48 states, indicating that the mode l "explains" 41% of the variance in interstate distributions of tax costs. More
important, Table 2 demonstrates that when separate regression analyses
aJ:e run for the socioeconomic and political variables used in this analysis, the political variables account for 31% of the variance while socioeconomics variables account for only 10% of the variance.
The model meets with more success when the regional distinction of
South and non-South is introduced . The multiple coefficient of determination for the 37 non-Southern states increases to .52. Once again, political variables ( R2 =.33) are found to have greater e>..'Planatoryvalue than
socioeconomic variables ( R2=.07).
Table 2 also presents simple and partial coefficients of correlati on for
each independent variable and progressive taxation for both the 48 states
and the non-Southern states. In general, the selected independent variables bear the hypothesized relationships to progressive taxation in both
the 48 states and the non-Southern states.
An examination of the simple correlation coefficients for all 48 states
reveals that five variables fail to achieve the hypothesized relati onship
with progressive taxation in the states . These variables include : the Cini
Index of Income Inequality, percentage under $3,000 annual income,
Democratic party strength, legislative accountability/ represen tativeness,
and percentage of Democrats on the Supreme Court. Three of these
negative findings ( Democratic party strength, percentage of Dem ocrats
on the Supreme Court, and legislative accountability/ representative ness)
are reversed when the Southern states are excluded from the analysis.
Turning to the partial correlation coefficients for all states, relationships contrary to those originally hypothesized are found for: urb anization, percentage under $3,000 annual income, the Sharkansky-Elaz ar political culture scale, legislative professionalism, and gubernatorial power
as measured by Schlesinger's composite index. For the non-Southern
states, industrialization and income are added to the list of contrary
findings.
Seven variables ( education, participation , interparty competition, legislative inducements to participation, gubernatorial tenure, innovativeness, and extent of civil service coverage) are related to progressive taxa-
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tion in a manner consistent with the original hypotheses for both simple
d partial correlation coefficients and regardless of regional breakdown.
;e evidence is convincing that progressive taxation in the American
states is positively related to each of these variables as originally hypothesized.
On the other hand, two variables ( interest group strength and percentage under $3,000 annual income) are related to progressive taxation
in a manner inconsistent with the original hypotheses for both simple
and partial correlation coefficients and regardless of regional breakdown.
I-Jere the evidence appears convincing that neither of these variables is
related to progressive taxation in the manner originally postulated.
Confining attention to the nine variables mentioned above, for which
the findings are rather conclusive, a number of observations appear in
order. Five of the variables found to be positively correlated with progressive taxation ( education, participation, interparty competition, and
interest group strength) are related in one way or another to the quantity of inputs processed by a state political system. 47 The general proposition supported by these findings is that political systems faced with
relatively high input loads are more likely to pursue progressive tax
policies than political systems receiving relatively low input levels.
The clearly positive relationship discovered between gubernatorial
tenure potential and progressive taxation seems particularly puzzling
when contrasted to the mixed results obtained in the case of Schlesinger's
composite index of gubernatorial power. The apparent contradiction im·
plied in these findings can be resolved to some degree in the light of
work done by Sarah McCally. 48 In her attempt to test the influence of
governors over their legislative parties, McCally found that the factor
which best explained the success of governors was the level of electoral
support received by the governors in subsequent primary elections.
Schlesinger interprets the findings of McCally in the following manner:
... the interpretation that fits well with our underlying thesis is that
politicians are most responsive to their expectations, and a governor
who has a good chance of returning gains a great deal of influence.
This interpretation suggests also that of the elements in our power
index, tenure potential is perhaps the most important. 49
The findings concerning the positive relationships which obtain between innovativeness, extent of civil service coverage, and progressive
47 Both interparty competition and education are correlated positively with electoral turnout.
48 Sarah P. McCally, "The Governor and His Legislative Party," Amesican Politcial Science Review, 60 ( 1966), 923-942.
49 Schlesinger, "Politics of the Executive," 235.
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taxation should be interpreted with some caution. Some compara tive
state policy analysts have argued that these two measures and legislative professionalism may be taken as indicators of "reformism" in state
government and are reflective of the success of the Progressive tradi tion
in American politics. 50 This argument, in effect, holds that while the vari.
ables directly measure certain characteristics of governmental institu.
tions, they are actually surrogate indicators of state political culture s.
Accepting this contention for the moment, the relationships foun d in
this analysis between innovativeness, civil service coverage, and progr es.
sive taxation would be interpreted as indicating that state politica l systems respond to "progressive" characteristics of their political cultur es
in adopting progressive tax measures.
A number of problems, however, are encountered in accepting the
argument that innovativeness and extent of civil service coverage represent elements of state political cultures to which state political systems
respond in making tax policy. First, Walker's Innovation Index is based
on a large number of state policy innovations which involve the expenditure of state funds. Of course, one major limitation on policy innovati on is
the lack of "slack" funds. Progressive tax measures such as the personal
income tax exhibit significantly more elasticity than do regressive tax
measures. 51 In other words, income tax collections tend to increase more
rapidly as personal income increases than do, for example, sales tax collections. This means that states relying upon progressive tax sources usually find the problem of increasing state tax revenues to be somewhat
less severe during periods of rising personal income. 52 As a result of th ese
considerations, an alternative explanation of the findings would be that
reliance upon progressive taxation is conducive to policy innovative ness.
This analysis does not provide any evidence which can successfully resolve the question of which interpretation is most correct. The question,
however, does appear to point to an area in which potentially fruitful
research could be conducted.
Other difficulties are encountered in accepting the "political culture"
explanation of the relationship discovered between extent of civil service
coverage and progressive taxation. An alternative explanation of this finding is that administrative professionalism as reflected in the extent of
civil service coverage is itself a contributing factor to progressive tax
policy decisions. Fenton has argued that as civil service coverage ex·
pands, "job oriented" employees are replaced by "issue-oriented" employees who perceive rewards more in terms of program developmen t and
50 See Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewoods Cliff,
sey: Prentice-Hall , 1975), 296-297.
51 Penniman, "The Politics of Taxation," 546-548.
52 Jbid.
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owth than in terms of employment security. 63 In addition, Wright has
und that state administratore are disposed to favor enlarging their own
:ograros and those of state government generally. 64 If state administraors are favorably inclined toward an expanded role for state government generally and their own programs in particular, and if civil service
employees are even more inclined toward this position, one might well
expect to find that state administrators whose job security is not dependent upon either the governor or the legislature are a formidable stimulus for increased state spending. Effective bureaucratic demands for increased state expenditures, in turn, might well stimulate a search for a
wide variety of methods of revenue collection, including progressive tax
measures such as the personal income tax. Again, the data presented here
cannot indicate which of these two explanations of the link between civil
service coverage and progressive taxation is most correct. The data does
however rather clearly indicate that such a link does in fact exist.
The unexpected finding that interest group strength is positively correlated with progressive taxation deserves attention . Two caveats concerning this finding should be entered at this point. First, the measure
of interest group strength used in this analysis is derived from data which
antedates the dependent variable by almost twenty years, and, perhaps
more important, the measure reflects assessment of the strength of interest groups in general, rather than the strength of particular types of
interest groups, e.g., merchants, unionized workers, manufacturers, and
teachers. Second, the original hypotheses assumed that business groups
and middle and upper income groups would be hostile to progressive
tax measures. Business interests, however, might well prefer personal
income taxes to high property taxes truly reflective of the value of industrial and commercial property or to sales taxes which add to the
effective price consumers must pay for goods and services. The interpretation of this finding which is most consistent with the previous discussion is that whether participation is measured by voting turnout, by
factors which stimulate turnout, or by interest group strength, high input
levels are associated with increased reliance on progressive taxes.
The negative relationship discovered between the percentage of families with incomes under $3,000 annual income and progressive taxation
should be evaluated in light of the positive relationships between progressive taxation and legislative inducements to participation and the

f

53 John Fenton, People and Parties in Politics ( Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman,
1966), 46-49, 50-78.
54 Deil S. Wright, "Executive Leadership in State Administration," Midwest Journal af Political Science, 11 ( 1967), 1-26.
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overall rate of electoral participation. As Fry and Winters noted in explaining similar results in their analysis of the politics of redistribution :
If we are correct in assuming that the latter two measures [legisla.
tive inducements and electoral participation] indicate the extent of
electoral participation by lower income groups, we can tentatively
conclude that, as might be expected, redistribution to the lowest
income classes is more a function of participation by these classes
than of their size.55

The major :finding of this study concerns the relative importance of
political and socioeconomic variables in explaining interstate variation s
in the distribution of tax costs. As noted earlier, most studies of state
policy outputs have found that socioeconomic variables have greate r
impact on interstate variations in policy than do political variables. This
analysis, however, :finds that political variables have substantial independent impact on state tax policies and that they have considerab ly
more impact than socioeconomic variables. The relative explanatory
power of the political and socioeconomic variables used in this analysis
is indicated by the multiple-partial coefficients of determination displaye d
in Table 2. For the 48 states the multiple-partial for political variable s
controlled for socioeconomic variables is .34, while the multiple-partia l
for the socioeconomic variables controlled for the political variables is .14.
For the non-Southern states, the multiple-partial for the political variables
controlled for socioeconomic variables is .48 while the multiple-parti al
for the socioeconomic variables controlled for political variables is .28.
For both the 48 states and the non-Southern states, the political variab les
included in this analysis are considerably more powerful than the socioeconomic variables in explaining variance in state tax policies.
An objection which could be raised against this interpretation of the
multiple-partial coefficients is that the :finding may be an artifact of the
sheer number of political variables used in this analysis relative to the
number of socioeconomic variables. One method of confronting this
objection bas been employed in this study. Taking only the :five most
powerful political variables versus the :fivemost powerful socioeconomic
variables, the multiple-partial for the political variables controlled for
the socioeconomic variables is .36, while the multiple-partial for the
socioeconomic variables controlled for the political variables is .17 for
the 48 states. When the same comparison is made for the non-Southe rn
states, the multiple-partial for political variables controlled for socioeconomic variables is .41, while the multiple-partial for socioeconomic
variables controlled for political variables is .17.
55

Fry and Winters, op. cit., 521.
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concluswn
This study has presented an explanatory analysis of the correlates of
rogressive taxation in the American states. The analysis indicated that
~e educational level of the citizenry, electoral turnout, party competition, legislative inducements to participation, interest group strength,
gubernatorial tenure potential, extent of civil service coverage, and policy
innovativeness were positively related to reliance upon progressive taxation. The percentage of families under $3,000 annual income was found
to be negatively associated with progressive taxation.
More broadly, the study addressed the question of whether political
characteristics of the states have any significant relationship with the
distribution of tax costs among income groups. The results demonstrate,
at least tentatively, that political variables have a greater impact on state
tax decisions than the previous literature would have led one to believe
and that political variables have greater explanatory value in this policy
area than do socioeconomic variables. By turning attention from the
explanation of revenue and expenditure levels to the explanation of policy
costs and benefits, political scientists are more likely to encounter a
dimension of public policy that is influenced significantly by political
phenomena.
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TABLE 1. Progressive to Regressive Tax Ratios for the 48 States, 1971

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Oregon ..............
. . 2.563
Delaware ..............
2.133
Massachusetts ..........
1.437
New York . .... ........
1.328
Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .949
Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . .918
Wisconsin . ............
.902
Maryland ...............
858
Idaho .. .. .............
.787
Vermont ............
.... 708
Virginia ...............
.704
Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .654
California . . . . . . . . . . . . . .600
North Carolina . .... . ... .596
Illinois .. .. ............
.534
Utah ..................
.453
Michigan .. .... . .......
.438
Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . .436
Iowa ..............
. ... .416
Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .403
South Carolin a .........
.386
Kansas .............
. .. .385
Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . .356
Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .353

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . .
Missouri ........
. ......
Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Connecticut .. . ... . ....
Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Hampshire . . . . . . .
Arizona .. . ............
North Dakota ...... . ...
Arkansas ..............
Louisiana ...........
..
New Mexico . . . . . . .....
Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
West Virginia . . ... . ... .
New Jersey ............
Tennessee ............
.
Mississippi ........
....
South Dakota . . . . . . . . . .
Washington ..........
.
Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Florida . . ..............
Wyoming ..... . .......
Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.352
.341
.338
.333

.333
.315
.285
.280
.277
.271
.257
.247
.235
.209
.186
.176
.172
.039
.025
.023
.014
.014
.012
.000
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TABLE 2. Summary of Findings
I. Variables
Socioeconomic Variables

ALL STATES

Simple
Resources
Urbanization
......
.. ..... . .21
Indu strialization ..... . . . ... . . . .11
Education ..... . ............
. .21
Median Income .........
. .... . .29
Needs
Cini Index ......
......
.. . ... . -.23
% under $3,000 .............
. . -.29
Demand Structure
Political Culture . . . . .... . . . . .. . .
Electoral Turnout ..............
.
Party Competition . . .. . .... . ... .
Democratic Strength ...........
.
I.G. Strength ........
. .........
.
Leg. Inducements .............
.
Governmental Institutions
Leg. Account / Rep ............
.
Leg. Professionalism .. . . . .... .. .
Leg. Party Cohesion ... . .......
.
Governor Power . . ... . .........
.
Governor Tenure ..............
.
%Democrats Supreme Court ..... .
Innovation Index . . .......
.. . .. .
Civ. Serv. Coverage .. . .... .

Partial

NON-SOUTHERN
Simple

Partial

-.13
.10
.16
.01

.19
.13
.12
.21

-.21
-.07
.12
-.18

.36
-.12

-.08
-.22

.47
-.33

-.22
.27
-.29
-.13
.02
.18

.06
.29
.01
.12
.33
.10

-.10
.17
-.20
.08
.16
.12

.32
.38
.07
.13
.48
.24

-.05

.23
-.07
.13
-.20
.30
.06
.16
.32

.01
.28
.27
.14
.22
-.02
.29
.19

.04
-.18
.19
-.26
.22
.17
.34
.46

R
.72
.26
.57

R2
.52
.07
.33

.25
.34
.23
.27
-.16

.35
.22

II. Multiple Coefficients of Correlation and Determination
All Variables . .................
...
Socioeconomic Variables ......
.. .. .
Political Variables . .
. .. .. ... . . .

R

R2

.64
.31
.56

.48
.10
.31

III. Multiple-Partial Coefficients of Determination
Political Variables Controlled
for Socioeconomic Variables . . . . . . . . . . .34
Socioeconomic Variables Controlled
for Political Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

.48

.28

